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Abstract: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) permits State Parties to 
establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 200 nautical miles from their coast. Coastal States 
have exclusive jurisdiction over resources within the EEZ, but navigational and other high seas 
freedoms continue to exist. A significant number of States have, however, enacted legislation that 
departs from the LOSC, interfering with the navigational rights and freedoms of other States. This 
article analyses this development with a specific focus on the Arctic. It investigates the powers of 
Arctic coastal States to regulate shipping in the EEZ and thereby navigation in the Arctic Ocean. 
It adds to the existing literature by providing an analysis of State practice, suggesting that despite 
uncertainty concerning the interpretation of the LOSC Article 234 and the right to exercise 
legislative jurisdiction over ice-covered waters, a not insignificant number of States have claimed 
jurisdiction in their own EEZ beyond the rights granted in the LOSC, and are therefore not in a 
position to object to extensive jurisdictional claims in the Arctic. 
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I. Introduction 
The Arctic Ocean is subject to increasing attention. Climate change and the resulting rise in 
temperatures has, among other things, raised interest in using the Arctic for commercial shipping 
between Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.1 An interest that was strengthened in 2017, 
when, for the first time, a cargo ship travelled through the northern sea route without an 
icebreaker escort, highlighting how climate change is opening up the high Arctic.2 The Arctic 
Ocean has two other important features, making it the subject of specific interest. Firstly, the 
Arctic Ocean is completely encircled by the coastal seas of the five Arctic coastal States, also 
known as the “Arctic Five” (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway/Svalbard, Russia and the 
United States of America) all of which have claimed an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).3 Thus, 
while there are still significant areas of high seas in the Central Arctic Basin, the Arctic Ocean 
itself can only be accessed after navigating through the EEZ or territorial sea of the Arctic Five, 
including by way of the Northwest and Northeast Passage.4 Another important feature is that 
parts of the Arctic Ocean are covered by multi-year ice.5 Article 234 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC/Convention) provides States with a special right to 
adopt and enforce environmental laws and regulations in ice-covered areas within their EEZ that 
are stricter than general international standards. These two features, coupled with the increased 
interest in the Arctic Ocean as a new and valuable commercial route, merit an analysis of the 
rights of the Arctic coastal States to regulate shipping in the EEZ.6 In order to examine this issue, 
the article first provides a working definition of the “Arctic Ocean”. It then examines the powers 
of coastal States to regulate shipping in the EEZ, focusing on civil navigation.7 Finally, it 
addresses the general rights of coastal States to enact environmental laws and regulations, as well 
as the special rights conferred upon them in regards to ecologically sensitive and ice-covered 
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areas in the EEZ. After having examined the relevant provisions in the LOSC, the article 
assesses whether State practice might have changed the traditional interpretation of the LOSC 
creating new rights to regulate shipping. Most of the already abundant literature on Article 234 
focuses on a textual interpretation of the said provision and its drafting history.8 By contrast, 
little attention has been paid to subsequent practice regarding the application of Article 234. In 
addition, the article also considers practice outside the Arctic, concluding that irrespective of the 
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of Article 234, a not insignificant number of States 
have claimed jurisdiction in their own EEZ beyond the rights granted in the LOSC, and are 
therefore not in a position to object to extensive jurisdictional claims in the Arctic. 
II  The Arctic Ocean 
There is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic Ocean. In order to avoid possible 
politically and legally sensitive issues, the present article relies on the definition of “Arctic Waters” 
in the new Chapter XIV of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).9  
Regulation 1 – Definitions 
3. Arctic waters mean those waters which are located north of a line from the latitude 
58º00΄.0 N and longitude 042º00΄.0 W to latitude 64º37΄.0 N, longitude 035º27΄.0 W 
and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 67º03΄.9 N, longitude 026º33΄.4 W and thence 
by a rhumb line to the latitude 70º49΄.56 N and longitude 008º59΄.61 W (Sørkapp, 
Jan Mayen) and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to 73º31'.6 N and 019º01'.0 E by 
the Island of Bjørnøya, and thence by a great circle line to the latitude 68º38΄.29 N 
and longitude 043º23΄.08 E (Cap Kanin Nos) and hence by the northern shore of the 
Asian Continent eastward to the Bering Strait and thence from the Bering Strait 
westward to latitude 60º N as far as Il'pyrskiy and following the 60th North parallel 
eastward as far as and including Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the 
North American continent as far south as latitude 60º N and thence eastward along 
parallel of latitude 60º N, to longitude 056º37΄.1 W and thence to the latitude 
58º00΄.0 N, longitude 042º00΄.0 W.  
 
The definition establishes an almost perfect circle, with the North Pole at its centre and the 
boundary of what constitutes Arctic waters running on the 60th northern parallel. Only at the 
southern tip of Greenland and in the westerly part of Russia is the circular line interrupted and the 
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Arctic waters’ boundary defined with reference to specific seas, islands, capes, straits, passages 
and bays. As such, most of the Arctic waters are within the Arctic Circle (approximately 66.3o N) 
and include the coastal waters of the Arctic Five.10  
1. Regulating Shipping in the Arctic  
The Arctic waters, like any other part of the world’s oceans, are regulated by the LOSC. Four of 
the five Arctic coastal States have ratified the LOSC and the US, which has not, generally accepts 
that the Convention reflects customary international law.11  In addition, the Arctic waters are 
subject to a vast array of international treaties.12 International law applicable to commercial vessels 
is predominantly found in various treaties adopted within the IMO. Prominent among these are the 
MARPOL and SOLAS conventions.13 Until the entry into force of the Polar Code in January 
2017,14 most IMO conventions contained few provisions specific to the Arctic and most provided 
that the sole responsibility to implement and enforce international standards rested with flag 
States.15 
Despite being the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic waters cover some 14.056 million 
square kilometres, making it almost six times larger than the Mediterranean Sea.16 Climate change 
and the resulting rise in temperatures have raised interest in using the Arctic waters for commercial 
shipping between Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Two routes in particular are 
garnering substantial interest: (1) along the northern coast of North America (known as the 
“Northwest Passage”); and (2) around the North Cape and along the north coast of Eurasia and 
Siberia until the Bering Strait (which includes what is known as the “Northeast Passage” or 
“Northern Sea Route”).17 
Both passages are surrounded by controversy. According to the official Canadian position, 
the Northwest Passage lies within Canada’s historic internal waters. This claim is contested both 
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by the United States and the European Union which protested the drawing of straight baselines 
around the Canadian Arctic archipelago in 1986.18 It is the Russian Government’s position that 
parts of the Northern Sea Route lie within Russia’s territorial sea and internal waters.19 Thus, 
whatever laws or regulations Canada and Russia adopt for the Northwest Passage or the Northern 
Sea Route – by virtue of the sovereignty coastal States exercise in their internal waters and 
territorial sea – will affect navigation to or from the Arctic. The same is true for similar regulation 
by other Arctic States. The following section will focus on what rights appertain to coastal States 
in regulating shipping in the EEZ. 
III. The Exclusive Economic Zone   
The establishment of the EEZ is a comparatively recent innovation in the law of the sea. During 
the negotiations of the First and Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1958 and 1960, 
States failed even to agree on the limits of the territorial sea.20 Agreement was only finally reached 
during the Third UN Conference 1973-1982 (see Article 3 of the LOSC which establishes a 
maximum breadth of 12 nautical miles). 
The Third UN Conference also produced an agreement on the establishment of the EEZ.21 
The agreement represented a revolutionary development of the international law of the sea, 
bringing about one third of the world’s oceans within coastal States’ jurisdiction.22 The LOSC 
gave, inter alia, coastal States “sovereign rights” over natural resources within the EEZ, but not 
sovereignty.23 Other than providing sovereign rights over natural resources in their EEZ, the LOSC 
provides an explicit basis, and indeed an obligation, for States to regulate, protect, and preserve 
the marine environment.24  
The agreement on the EEZ represented a compromise between two competing sets of 
interests. The first group included States that had staked extensive claims to broad territorial seas 
 {PAGE  } 
and fishing zones.25 The second group was represented by major maritime powers, which while 
supporting coastal States’ right to explore and exploit the natural resources in coastal waters, also 
wanted to ensure the freedom of navigation.26 The compromise achieved in Part V of the LOSC 
reflects the traditional balance that has shaped the law of the sea, viz. the balance between the 
competing interests of coastal States and major maritime powers.27 
Article 55 of the LOSC defines the EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea”, 
subject to the specific legal regime established in Part V of the LOSC. It further provides that,  
…the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other 
States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.  
 
Thus, the rights of all States – coastal or otherwise – are regulated by the LOSC. This means that 
the EEZ is neither under the complete sovereignty of coastal States nor part of the high seas.28  
1. Navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
Navigational freedom is an essential part of the law of the sea. The LOSC contains various 
navigational regimes which apply in distinct zones: “innocent passage” through the territorial 
sea,29 the “right of transit passage” through international straits,30 the “right of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage” in archipelagic waters,31 and “freedom of navigation” on the high seas.32 What 
distinguishes the various forms of navigational rights is the degree of jurisdiction States may 
exercise over foreign flagged vessels navigating in the different zones.  
In relation to the EEZ, the drafters of the LOSC sought to balance the rights of maritime 
States in relation to freedom of navigation with the interests of coastal States in regards to the 
environment and resources in adjacent seascapes. Thus, Article 58 of the LOSC guarantees 
freedom of navigation: 
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, 
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in 
Article 87 of navigation… and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to 
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these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships… and compatible 
with the other provisions of this Convention. 
 
However, Article 58 also clearly provides that the freedom of navigation in the EEZ is subject to 
limitations defined in other articles of the LOSC.33 One such limitation is imposed by Article 58(3) 
which stipulates that States exercising their rights in the EEZ must “have due regard to the rights 
and duties of the coastal State” and that they must comply with the laws and regulations adopted 
by the coastal State in accordance with the LOSC. Similarly, Article 87(2) of the LOSC provides 
that the freedoms on the high seas shall be exercised with “due regard” for the interests and rights 
of other States. In addition, foreign flagged ships are subject to coastal States’ powers for pollution 
control, including special powers over environmentally sensitive areas, which include ice-covered 
areas, as will be explained below. 
2. Pollution Control over Foreign Flagged Ships 
Coastal States’ jurisdictional powers in the territorial sea are relatively unrestricted,34 whereas 
powers within the EEZ are substantially restrained.35  The scope of costal States’ powers for 
pollution control are elaborated in Part XII of the LOSC, which deals with the prevention of marine 
pollution from various sources: land-based marine pollution,36 the dumping of waste,37 pollution 
from seabed activities,38 pollution from the atmosphere,39 and the most relevant to this study, 
pollution from vessels.40 Article 211(5) of the LOSC states that coastal States: 
 …may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and 
giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established 
through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.  
 
It follows that all laws regulating pollution of foreign flagged vessels in the EEZ must conform to 
and give effect to generally accepted international rules and standards, commonly adopted via the 
IMO.41 
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Enforcement jurisdiction is also limited. Physical inspection of foreign flagged vessels in 
the EEZ may only occur where a vessel has refused to give information relevant to pollution 
control, or if the information supplied is manifestly at variance with the evident factual situation.42 
There must, moreover, be “clear grounds” for believing that a vessel has committed a violation 
resulting in a “substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine 
environment”.43  
A coastal State may only take enforcement measures where there is “clear objective 
evidence” that a vessel has committed a violation resulting in a discharge causing “major damage 
or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State” or “to any 
resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone”.44 Thus, unless a vessel calls into one 
of its ports, a coastal State can only interfere with the navigation of a foreign vessel in its EEZ 
where significant pollution or major damage to the environment has occurred or is threatened. 
Coastal States have no explicit authority in the LOSC to take preventative measures.45  
There are two exceptions to the general requirement that coastal States’ environmental 
legislation targeting the EEZ must conform to international standards. The first exception concerns 
ecologically sensitive areas and the second concerns ice-covered areas. 
In ecologically sensitive areas within their EEZ, coastal States may, in accordance with 
Article 211(6) of the LOSC, adopt special measures where international rules and standards are 
“inadequate to meet special circumstances”. However, the establishment of such special measures 
requires prior consultation through a “competent international organization” (i.e. the IMO), as well 
as consultation with any concerned State.46 As no State has ever made use of this provision, it is 
currently of a more academic than practical interest.47 
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It follows that coastal States’ power to protect and preserve the marine environment in the 
EEZ is limited. States, for example, could not generally ban the movement of hazardous waste or 
prevent navigation by certain vessels, such as oil tankers.48 Thus, while the LOSC contains detailed 
rules providing coastal States with legislative jurisdiction to protect against pollution, they cannot, 
except for very limited circumstances, interfere with the navigational rights of foreign flagged 
vessels.49 The only possible exception is in ice-covered areas. 
(a) Ice-Covered Areas 
Ice-covered areas are subject to a special legal regime. In ice-covered areas, coastal States may, in 
accordance with Article 234, adopt and enforce non-discriminatory environmental laws that are 
stricter than general international standards. This was a unique development of the law of the sea, 
initiated by Canada and negotiated during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea with 
the Soviet Union and the US, with little interest or opposition shown by other States.50 
The negotiations were chiefly driven by the Canadian government, which was trying to 
achieve international support for its 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, under which 
Canada unilaterally claimed competence to regulate pollution out to 100 nautical miles from its 
shore.51 This underlying aim was explicitly recognised by the US, which stated that the purpose of 
Article 234 was to “provide the basis for implementing the provisions applicable to commercial 
and private vessels found in the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollutions Prevention Act”.52  
Unlike Canada, which was mainly interested in environmental protection, the United 
States’ and the Soviet Union’s main interest was freedom of navigation.53 The resulting provision 
was yet another compromise which, although it ostensibly concerns all ice-covered areas, is “really 
only about the Arctic Ocean.”54  
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Article 234 provides coastal States with the “right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory 
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels”, 
without any procedural requirements or need for prior consultation.55 At the same time, Article 
234 is restricted and only applies to:  
…ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for 
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution 
of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of 
the ecological balance.  
 
Furthermore, any laws or regulations adopted pursuant to Article 234 must have “due regard to 
navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best 
available scientific evidence”.  
The wording of Article 234 reflects a delicate balance between competing priorities and as 
a result, its interpretation is shrouded in uncertainty: it has in fact been described as “probably the 
most ambiguous, if not controversial, clause in the entire treaty [LOSC].”56  
It is commonly agreed that coastal States can unilaterally adopt pollution control measures 
within their EEZ that are stricter than generally accepted international standards, but where and 
when Article 234 grants this right is disputed. One interpretation confines the scope of Article 234 
to the EEZ, excluding the territorial sea.57 Another includes the territorial sea, straits and, so far as 
relevant, internal waters.58 The second interpretation seems contrary to Article 55 of the LOSC, 
which defines the EEZ as the area “beyond and adjacent to” the territorial sea, but it does promote 
desirable consistency as it would allow States to apply the same standards to both their territorial 
seas and their EEZ.59 In contrast, if Article 234 does not apply to the territorial sea, it leads to the 
anomalous result that coastal States have greater powers to regulate shipping in ice-covered areas 
of their EEZ than in ice-covered areas of their territorial sea.60 
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There is, moreover, no common definition of “ice-covered areas” or indeed any of the 
various cumulative conditions that must be fulfilled before Article 234 applies, such as “severe 
climatic conditions”, ice-cover for “most of the year”, or “obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation”, all of which are open to interpretation.61  
There is also significant uncertainty as to how far Article 234 allows coastal States to limit 
the freedom of navigation, with some views almost diametrically opposed. Some scholars take a 
de minimis view, according to which the importance of Article 234 should not be overstated and 
that it cannot be read as “conferring upon the Arctic States the ability to implement marine 
pollution provision for the entire Arctic Ocean.”62 Others, in contrast, take a de maximis view, 
according to which coastal States have wide-ranging powers under Article 234 which allow States 
to “regulate shipping in substantially the same way as [they] would if the waters were… internal 
waters” and that the “main limitation with Article 234 is that the authority it grants to coastal states 
does not extend to the regulation of warships or other government vessels.”63 Two vital aspects 
are at the heart of both interpretations: the geographical extent of Article 234 and the scope of 
coastal States’ legislative jurisdiction. Both extremes, de minimis and de maximis interpretations, 
are reflected in State practice, although the de maximis stance, as will be illustrated below, has 
only been espoused by Canada and Russia.  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding its interpretation and application, Article 234 is 
important because it potentially provides Arctic States with an explicit and extensive power to 
regulate navigation to and from the Arctic, strengthening the otherwise limited powers of coastal 
States in the EEZ.  
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IV. Practice by the Arctic Five 
Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding Article 234, most States seem to accept that it is lex 
specialis in respect of coastal States’ jurisdiction in Arctic waters.64 How far the scope of their 
jurisdiction extends is, however, controversial and the wording of Article 234 is unclear.  
Numerous scholars have sought to clarify the meaning of Article 234, but little consensus 
exists.65 It seems futile to add to the already abundant literature seeking to find the “true” meaning 
of Article 234 by way of a textual interpretation. Instead, the remainder of this article will focus 
on State practice.  
It is a well-established principle that subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, as a 
reflection of the parties’ agreement regarding its interpretation, can be taken into account when 
interpreting the terms of a specific provision. The principle is recognised both in treaty and 
customary international law.66 As every application of a treaty presupposes some interpretation of 
its provisions, practice may reflect the original intention of the parties, and thus aid in its 
interpretation, or it may reflect a subsequent consensus among the parties concerning the meaning 
of a specific provision. 
A subsequent consensus may even override the original meaning of the drafters.67 This 
outcome, however, is controversial and while some international tribunals have occasionally 
confirmed that subsequent practice may lead to a modification of the express terms of a treaty, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to prefer to use subsequent practice to confirm a broad 
interpretation of extant treaty provisions, even if such an interpretation may stretch the ordinary 
meaning of the terms applied.68 
This still leaves the question: what is subsequent practice? The International Law 
Commission (ILC) has recognised that subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) consists of any “conduct” in the application of a treaty 
that may contribute to establishing an agreement regarding its interpretation. 69  This includes 
legislative practice, as well as executive and judicial acts.70 Arguably, it also includes legislative 
practice that predates the treaty, if this practice continues after the relevant State becomes a party, 
such as Canada’s 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act and its subsequent ratification of 
the LOSC.71 
How much practice is needed is uncertain, but the ICJ and most other international tribunals 
have been flexible in their approach.72 The ILC has suggested that: 
Subsequent practice under article 31(3)(b) can take a variety of forms and must reflect 
a common understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty. Its value 
as a means of interpretation depends on the extent to which it is concordant, common 
and consistent.73  
 
The formula “concordant, common and consistent” does not establish a minimum threshold but 
the extent to which subsequent practice complies with the formula may reveal a discernible pattern 
and thus the agreement of the parties. 74  Accordingly, the ILC has found that “the value of 
subsequent practice varies depending on how far it shows the common understanding of the parties 
as to the meaning of the terms.”75 
The tribunal established pursuant to the LOSC in the South China Sea Arbitration stated 
that ICJ decisions confirm that the “threshold for accepting an agreement on the interpretation by 
State practice is quite high.”76 Gardiner writes that the practice must be “concordant”, that is, 
identical or sufficiently identical so as to demonstrate the parties’ agreement.77 He further states 
that this does not necessarily mean that there has been abundant practice by all parties to a treaty, 
but rather that the practice of one or two States suffices if there is good evidence that other parties 
have endorsed the practice.78 Similarly, Aust writes that although it is not necessary to show that 
each party has engaged in a practice, all must have accepted it, even if tacitly. 79  Dörr and 
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Schmalenbach state that if not every party has participated in the practice, there must be at least 
good evidence that the other inactive parties have endorsed it.80  
In relation to Article 234, it is therefore not sufficient to focus only on the practice of the 
Arctic coastal States. The reaction of other parties is equally important, as it may provide evidence 
that the practice has either been endorsed or rejected. Similarly, inaction may be important if it can 
be interpreted as acquiescence.  
Even though the practice of a few States may be sufficient to fulfil Article 31(3)(b) of the 
VCLT, the rule’s application in regards to Article 234 of the LOSC is, nonetheless, odd. Currently, 
the LOSC has 168 parties but only four of these can in effect rely on Article 234, viz. Canada, 
Denmark, Norway and Russia.81 The other States do not have maritime zones with multi-year ice-
cover. The only exception is the US, but it is not a party to the LOSC.  
Navigation in Arctic waters are moreover limited and, with a few notable exceptions, most 
of the parties to the LOSC seem to have little or no interest in the Arctic. Disinterested States are 
unlikely to object to practice by the Arctic States and it may therefore be difficult to assess whether 
all parties to the LOSC have accepted practice relating to Article 234. Reliance on State practice 
to clarify the content of this provision should therefore be exercised with the utmost care.82 
So far, only Canada and Russia have enacted legislation that is explicitly based on Article 
234 and both have seemingly gone beyond existing international standards, for instance, by 
requiring prior notification and authorisation for entry into their respective EEZ.83 The following 
section provides an overview of the practice of the Arctic Five regulating shipping in the EEZ.  
1. Canada 
Canadian Arctic environmental legislation not only predates, but was also a major catalyst for the 
adoption Article 234.84 The 1969 voyage of the American oil tanker, the Manhattan, through the 
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Northwest Passage created a “groundswell of opposition” within Canada and focused attention on 
the Arctic.85 This focus, combined with an increased environmental awareness, led to the adoption 
of the 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act.86 The Act applied to zones extending 100 
nautical miles from Canadian islands north of the 60th northern parallel and banned the discharge 
of all waste by vessels. It also regulated their design, construction and navigation within designated 
zones.  
The extension of legislative jurisdiction over the Arctic waters was clearly inconsistent 
with the then-existing legal regime and the US promptly objected on the grounds that: 
International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of 
jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States can neither accept nor acquiesce in 
the assertion of such jurisdiction. We are concerned that this action by Canada if not 
opposed by us, would be taken as a precedent in other parts of the world for other 
unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas. If Canada had the right to claim 
and exercise exclusive pollution and resource jurisdiction on the high seas, other 
countries could assert the right to exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some 
reasonable and some not, but all equally invalid according to international law.87 
 
The United States was the only State to formally object and the principle that coastal States are 
entitled to exercise legislative jurisdiction over ice-covered waters outside but adjacent to their 
territorial sea was eventually accepted and, as explained above, included in Article 234 of the 
LOSC. 
In 2009, Canada amended the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and extended the 
reach of its pollution regulation from 100 to 200 nautical miles,88 thus covering the entire Canadian 
EEZ in the Arctic.89 In addition, the previously voluntary vessel reporting system, NORDREG, 
was made mandatory in 2010.90  Under the new scheme, large non-governmental vessels are 
subject to a mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation.91 The system also applies to 
any vessel that transports pollutants or dangerous goods, regardless of size.92 Vessels that do not 
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report can be requested to leave Canadian waters and noncompliance is punishable by criminal 
sanctions and the possible detention of the vessel.93 
The notification and authorisation system applies to all Canadian “Arctic waters”, which 
are defined in the amended Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act as: 
…the internal waters of Canada and the waters of the territorial sea of Canada and the 
exclusive economic zone of Canada, within the area enclosed by the 60th parallel of 
north latitude, the 141st meridian of west longitude and the outer limit of the exclusive 
economic zone…94  
 
The Act takes into account Canada’s contentious claim to straight baselines around the islands that 
comprise the Canadian archipelago. 95  The definition includes various routes connecting the 
Beaufort Sea to the Davis Strait. 
Canada has justified its mandatory NORDREG system with reference to Article 234. In a 
formal submission to the IMO Safety Commission, Canada asserted, inter alia, that Article 234 
provided “a complete legal justification in international law for NORDREG.”96 Two States and 
international shipping organisations have objected to the mandatory notification and authorisation 
requirement.97  
As noted by the ILC, the conduct of non-State actors, such as international shipping 
organisations, does not constitute subsequent practice under Articles 31 of the VCLT, but may, 
nonetheless, be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of state parties.98 The reaction of 
state parties is, however, paramount. 
The two States that have unequivocally objected to NORDREG are the US and Singapore. 
The US has stated that whilst it supports the navigational safety and environmental protection 
objectives of NORDREG, it considers the mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation 
to be: 
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…a sweeping infringement of freedom of navigation within the exclusive economic 
zone and the right of innocent passage within the territorial sea, both of which are 
bedrock principles of the law of the sea.99 
 
Singapore has stated that: 
…it is not apparent how the mandatory ship reporting… ties in with the fundamental 
purpose of Article 234… which is to allow for the prevention, reduction and control 
of marine pollution.100 
 
This was not the first time that Canadian measures had caused international consternation. At the 
time of its accession to the 1978 Protocol to the MARPOL Convention on 16 November 1992, 
Canada deposited a declaration based on Article 234 which stated, inter alia, that Canada had the 
right to adopt and enforce special non-discrimination laws and regulations in ice-covered waters: 
…Consequently, Canada considers that its accession to the Protocol of 1978, as 
amended, relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78) is without prejudice to such Canadian laws and 
regulations as are now or may in the future be established in respect of Arctic waters 
within or adjacent to Canada. 101 
 
The US and a group of European States subsequently issued a communication insisting that laws 
and regulations enacted on the basis of Article 234 must have “due regard to navigation” and be 
based on the best available scientific evidence.102 
Whether Article 234 provides sufficient legal basis for NORDREG is still fiercely 
debated. 103  One feature that seems especially difficult to reconcile with Article 234 is the 
indiscriminate application of NORDREG above the 60th northern parallel, regardless of ice-cover, 
climatic conditions or conditions of navigation. Thus it seems fair to conclude that Canadian state 
practice supports a de maximis reading of Article 234, although this reading has been criticised 
both by the US and Singapore, as well as by international shipping organisations. 
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2. Russia 
In 2012, Russia adopted a new regulation governing shipping in the Arctic.104 The new regulation 
amended the existing legal framework dating from the Soviet era.105 The purpose of the 2012 
amendment was, inter alia, to improve environmental regulation in line with Article 234.106 The 
explanatory note to the new legislation explicitly invokes Article 234, stating that:  
The available Rules of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route approved by the 
Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR on September 14, 1990, are consistent 
with the requirements of Clause 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982 that empowers the coastal states to adopt and provide observance of the non-
discriminatory laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from the vessels in the regions within the exclusive economic 
zone covered with ice for the most of the year.107  
 
The explanatory note further states that the situation in the Arctic has changed dramatically since 
the Rules of Navigation in the Northern Sea Route were first approved and that the new rules 
provide an updated contemporary legal framework based on Article 234.108 
The Russian regulations apply to the “Northern Sea Route”, which is defined in Article 
5(1) of the amended Merchant Shipping Code as: 
…a water area adjoining the northern coast of the Russian Federation, including 
internal sea waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of 
the Russian Federation, and limited in the East by the line delimitating the sea areas 
with the United States of America and by the parallel of the Dezhnev Cape in the 
Bering Strait; in the West, by the meridian of the Cape Zhelanie to the Novaya Zemlya 
archipelago, by the east coastal line of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western 
limits of the Matochkin Shar, Kara Gates, Yugorski Shar Straits. 
 
Earlier legislation had controversially left open the possibility that Russia might extend legislative 
jurisdiction beyond its EEZ.109 This controversy now seems to have been settled, as the new 
definition does not extend Russian jurisdiction beyond either the Russian EEZ or to the adjacent 
parts of the Barents or Bering Sea.110 
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In 2013, Russia also adopted the “Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern 
Sea”. 111  The new rules establish rights and prerogatives that go beyond the existing legal 
framework.112 Similar to NORDREG, the Russian scheme subjects foreign flagged shipping to a 
mandatory system of prior notification and authorisation before entering the Russian EEZ.  
Although the stated aim of the new rules is to ensure “safe navigation and protection of the 
marine environment,” Russian practice does not always seem to support this goal.113 In 2013, for 
example, the Arctic Sunrise was denied access to the Northern Sea Route as part of Greenpeace’s 
operation “Save the Arctic”, which sought to stop offshore oil drilling and industrial fishing in 
Arctic waters. As part of its operation, Greenpeace wanted to stage a protest at the Russian offshore 
oil platform Prirazlomnaya, located within the Russian EEZ. Greenpeace made several 
unsuccessful applications for authorisation to enter Russia’s EEZ. In replying to the fourth 
application, the Russian authorities made explicit reference to Article 234.114 The Arctic Sunrise 
subsequently entered the Russian EEZ without authorisation and staged a protest near the 
Prirazlomnaya platform, with two activists managing to reach the platform itself. In response, the 
Arctic Sunrise was boarded by the Russian authorities and the crew detained.  
The detention led to several protests, including by the Netherlands, the flag State of the 
Arctic Sunrise. A Dutch Minister declared that “Article 234… is no license to inhibit the freedom 
of navigation without restrictions.”115 The case was brought before an arbitral tribunal constituted 
under annex VII of the LOSC. The tribunal was not satisfied that the “boarding, seizure, and 
detention of the Arctic Sunrise constituted enforcement in accordance with Article 234”, although 
this conclusion was based on factual circumstances and not an interpretation of the LOSC.116 This 
and other incidents do, however, show that the Russian authorities have become less tolerant of 
vessels sailing in their EEZ without prior authorisation.117 Russian legislation thus also supports a 
 {PAGE  } 
de maximis interpretation of Article 234, whereas the reaction of the Netherlands seems to suggest 
that Article 234 does not provide an unfettered right to interfere with the freedom of navigation. 
3. Denmark/Greenland118 
Denmark was one of the few States that spoke on record at the Third Law of the Sea Conference 
on the importance of Article 234, but it has not adopted any special legislation for ice-covered 
areas. 119  In 2002, Denmark introduced a mandatory vessel reporting system known as 
GREENPOS applicable to the Arctic waters around Greenland.120 Unlike the Canadian or Russian 
schemes, there is no requirement of prior authorization for entering the EEZ, but all ships on 
voyages to or from Greenlandic ports and places of call are required to report. A failure to do so 
can be punished with a fine or imprisonment.121 The rules are adopted in accordance with SOLAS 
regulation V/8-1.122  
Denmark’s Arctic strategy states that it will work to establish global rules and standards 
for navigation in the Arctic via the IMO. 123 The strategy further provides: 
Should it prove that agreement on global rules cannot be reached, and in view of the 
especially vulnerable Arctic environment and the unique challenges of security, the 
Kingdom will consider implementing non-discriminatory regional safety and 
environmental rules for navigation in the Arctic in consultation with the other Arctic 
states and taking into account international law, including the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea provisions regarding navigation in ice covered waters. 
 
The statement clearly refers to Article 234, although it does not impose a requirement for prior 
consultation. The reference could also be taken to mean that Denmark has reserved its right to rely 
on Article 234 at a later stage, although there is no need for this type of formal notice.124  
It may further be questioned whether the statement is still valid. The Polar Code entered 
into force in 2017, amending both SOLAS and MARPOL.125 It introduced mandatory rules on 
measures covering safety (part I-A) and pollution prevention (part II-A) as well as non-mandatory 
recommendations on a wide range of issues. The aim of the Polar Code is to supplement existing 
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IMO instruments in order to increase the safety of navigation and mitigate the impact on the people 
and environment in polar waters.126  
4. Norway/Svalbard 
Norway has not adopted any special legislation for ice-covered areas in its maritime zones. This 
can partly be explained by the fact that large parts of Norway’s Arctic waters are not ice-covered 
for most of the year. Article 234 is therefore inapplicable, although Canada and Russia’s broad 
exercise of legislative jurisdiction in their respective EEZ seems to suggest that the requirement 
has been interpreted generously. The lack of Norwegian regulation could therefore indicate a 
disagreement over the interpretation of Article 234 or simply a lack of interest. Another possible 
reason for the lack of legislation is that Norway’s maritime boundaries and jurisdiction over its 
Arctic waters have been disputed for decades, particularly near the Svalbard archipelago, which is 
located far north of the 60th northern parallel. 127  The 1920 Spitsbergen (today known as 
“Svalbard”) Treaty established Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago.128 Norway claims 
that the treaty does not affect its rights beyond the territorial sea around Svalbard.129 But several 
parties have contradicted this claim.130 Although it has encouraged States holding different views 
to go to the ICJ, Norway has largely refrained from challenging any contradictory claims.131 Thus 
in 1976 when Norway established an EEZ off its mainland it did not include Svalbard.132 One 
explanation for Norway’s restraint is it longs standing policy of maintaining of peace and stability 
in the area.133 
 
5. The United States134 
As noted initially, the US has not ratified the LOSC and can therefore only rely on Article 234 as 
the legal basis for its legislative jurisdiction if it reflects customary international law, which is 
 {PAGE  } 
accepted by the US.135 It is not, however, entirely clear how a provision that was negotiated by 
three States, with little interest shown by other States, and which has only been applied by Canada 
and Russia can have generated enough practice to satisfy the general requirements for the 
establishment of customary international law.136 Especially as Canada is the only State that had 
established a clear practice before becoming party to the LOSC, a significant fact given that the 
importance of subsequent practice remains theoretically unclear.137 In addition, the US position 
with regard to Article 234, has been somewhat inconsistent and ambiguous.138 
Unlike Canada and Russia, however, the US has not established a system of prior 
notification and authorisation for entering its EEZ. The US is, moreover, unlikely to do so as it 
would be inconsistent with its objections to the Canadian NORDREG scheme, as well as with its 
long established Freedom of Navigation Program, initiated in 1979 inter alia to preserve and 
protect global navigation rights.139  
The US is sometimes accused of having passed as equally far-reaching legislation as 
Canada and Russia, often with reference to the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (OPA), which was adopted 
in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.140 Brubaker, for instance, writes that while 
Russian and US laws are not directly comparable (because Russia has a formal system for prior 
notification and authorisation), the US system “clearly has procedures for determining authorised 
passage upon sufficient proof of financial security.”141 He continues: 
Under the OPA, if a foreign vessel cannot prove financial security, then denial of 
clearance into the USA or US navigable waters, detention at the place where the lack 
of evidence is discovered, and seizure and forfeiture with US navigable waters may 
result.142  
 
Brubaker refers to the Certificate of Financial Responsibility, issued by the National Pollution 
Funds Center of the US Coast Guard.143 A certificate is required by all vessels over 300 gross tons 
calling into US ports.144 The requirement also applies to foreign flagged vessel that use the EEZ 
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to “transship or lighter oil destined for a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”, 
which includes, but is not limited to, ports.145 In the latter case, a certificate is required both by the 
vessel that receives the oil as well as by the vessel that delivers it, although the latter may not visit 
a US port. Molenaar has referred to the requirement as a “very extensive and unusual exercise of 
port State jurisdiction”, which arguably constitutes an “unjustifiable interference with activities 
carried out by other States in the exercise of their rights” pursuant to the LOSC Article 194(4).146  
Even though the US regime established by the OPA is broader and more comprehensive 
than the international regime established under the auspices of the IMO, it is not as far reaching as 
either the Canadian or Russian laws applicable in the Arctic.147 Firstly, the OPA only applies to 
vessels that have a clear connection with the US, either by being destined, or cooperating with 
another vessel destined, for a place subject to US sovereignty.148 Thus vessels merely transiting 
through the American EEZ are not affected. Secondly, the exercise of legislative jurisdiction by 
the US may also be supported by traditional bases of jurisdiction, such as the territorial principle 
(via the effects doctrine) or the protective principle.149 The application of the effects doctrine to 
vessels that have not yet reached port is controversial, but not uncommon.150  
V. Preliminary Conclusions: Arctic Practice is Inconclusive 
The practice of the Arctic coastal States sheds little light on the interpretation of Article 234. While 
both Canada and Russia have implemented far-reaching laws, neither Denmark nor Norway has 
exercised its right under Article 234. The US cannot directly rely on Article 234, and its domestic 
legislation is, in any case, less intrusive than that of Canada and Russia. It is further important to 
note that the adoption of extensive legislation and/or the exercise of authority over (ostensibly) 
ice-covered areas has sometimes been met by protest. There are therefore clear differences of 
opinion, and the practice of Canada and Russia cannot be said to reflect a consensus among parties 
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to the LOSC. This means that there is little support in State practice for a de maximis interpretation 
of Article 234. The silence of many states also means that there is little support for a de minimis 
interpretation, but as will be seen in the next section, general practice concerning legislative 
jurisdiction over the EEZ might also influence the interpretation of Article 234. 
VI. Practice from outside the Arctic: creeping jurisdiction 
A significant number of States outside the Arctic have enacted legislation that departs from the 
LOSC, interfering with the navigational rights and freedoms of foreign States.151 Most of the 
legislation concerns military use of the EEZ,152 but there is also a tendency to implement extensive 
rules on civil navigation, in particular in relation to environmental protection. The tendency of 
coastal States to exercise ever wider control over the EEZ has been referred to as “creeping 
jurisdiction”153 or “territorialisation”154 of the EEZ.  
Various States have made extensive claims restricting navigation in the EEZ. Some States 
have asserted that they have a right to be informed of planned voyages carrying ultra-hazardous 
cargo, such as nuclear material.155 India, for example, requires 24-hour advance notice before 
vessels carrying hazardous and dangerous goods can transit through its EEZ. 156  Other States 
maintain that they have not only a right to be informed, but that they can also deny passage of such 
cargo through their EEZ.157  
The controversy concerning the advance notification requirement is reflected in 
declarations and objections to the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. The Convention inter alia seeks to restrict 
the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, but explicitly acknowledges that nothing in 
the “Convention shall affect in any way the... rights and freedoms as provided for in international 
law and as reflected in relevant international instruments”, such as the LOSC. 158  
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Several States, including Egypt, Colombia, Mexico, Portugal, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 
have made declarations intimating that the Basel Convention strengthens their jurisdiction over 
the EEZ.159 However, a number of other States have objected to any assertion that the Basel 
Convention requires prior permission or authorization for the passage of vessels transporting 
hazardous wastes while exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or 
freedom of navigation in the EEZ.160 
The LOSC contains no provision that allows coastal States to regulate the transport of 
goods through the EEZ per se and such restrictions are therefore difficult to reconcile with the 
Convention.161 Kraska writes that as a result of coastal States pressing for stronger environmental 
regulations on foreign flagged ships in the EEZ, many States are now reluctant to exercise their 
rights to transport nuclear material.162  
It is not only ultra-hazardous cargo that is being limited. After the Prestige oil spill in 2002, 
Spain, France and Portugal banned single hulled oil tankers from their EEZ. 163 At the time, these 
measures were stricter than the international standards and incompatible with the LOSC.164 Other 
States have gone even further. One of the most extreme cases is the Maldives, which requires prior 
authorisation for any foreign flagged vessel to enter its EEZ, regardless of its cargo.165 Many other 
States have made extensive claims of jurisdiction and at least five States – Barbados, Guyana, 
India, Mauritius and Pakistan – claim the right to extend any law in force within their territorial 
sea to the EEZ.166 Burma claims rights and jurisdiction for the construction, maintenance or 
operation of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and other structures and devices 
necessary for the exploration of its natural resources, which is permitted under the LOSC, but also, 
for the convenience of shipping, or for any other purpose.167 Grenada, Guyana, India, Mauritius, 
Pakistan and the Seychelles claim similar rights.168 
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While these excessive maritime claims are well documented, 169  according to Kraska, 
nearly all States have failed to protest.170 Accordingly, the “cumulative result of this diplomatic 
nonfeasance is that the clear direction of the global trend in oceans politics and law is toward 
diminished rights and freedoms in the EEZ.” 171  This might, however, be an overstatement. 
Although a significant number of States have acted in a way that is clearly inconsistent with the 
LOSC, as Churchill concludes, none of the practice seems 
…sufficiently widespread or uniform to amount to an agreed interpretation of the 
Convention [LOSC] or to have given rise to a new rule of customary international law 
modifying or supplementing the Convention.172 
 
Although Churchill reached this conclusion in 2005, as the number of States claiming extensive 
rights in the EEZ remains limited, his assessment is still valid today. This is inter alia confirmed 
by protests levelled against the declaration made by Ecuador upon accession to the LOSC in 2012, 
providing that within its “maritime spaces”, which included the EEZ,  
prior notification and authorization shall be required for the transit through its 
maritime spaces of ships powered by nuclear energy or transporting radioactive, toxic, 
hazardous or harmful substances. 173 
 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the European Union protested the Ecuadorian declaration. 174 
Although the above mentioned practice might not modify the LOSC or create new 
customary norms, it is still significant. Indeed, those States that have claimed a right to exercise 
extensive jurisdiction in their EEZ – such as Barbados, Guyana, India, Mauritius and Pakistan – 
or have adopted rules on prior notification and/or authorisation – such as India or the Maldives – 
are no longer in a position to object to such measures by Canada or Russia. They are in effect 
estopped. 175  The same is true of those States that have accepted the extensive jurisdictional 
claims.176 Even States that have not officially accepted such claims but are specially affected and 
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have failed to protest might be said to have acquiesced.177 This could have been the case, for 
example, in regards to the Arctic Sunrise incident, if the Netherlands had not protested over 
Russia’s exercise of jurisdiction based on Article 234.178  
It is important to note, however, that not every lack of protest should be interpreted as 
acquiesce. In this regard, Churchill writes that there are several good theoretical and practical 
reasons why a State should not be considered as having impliedly recognised or acquiesced in 
practice by parties to a multilateral treaty.179 Firstly, if a failure to protest could so easily be 
regarded as acquiescence, it would undermine the fundamental principle that agreements must be 
performed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda). Similarly, if States could adopt practice contrary 
to the Convention and if such practices is then accepted merely by reason of the absence of protests, 
individual States are in effect being given a right of unilateral interpretation of their obligations, 
which seems to weaken the prohibition in the LOSC against reservations.180  
Imposing a strict obligation to protest would also arguably place too onerous a burden upon 
State parties, forcing them to constantly monitor a great number of multilateral treaties.  
VII. Conclusion 
There is obviously some controversy concerning the right to regulate shipping in the Arctic. Article 
234 is unclear and neither the drafting history nor subsequent practice in the application of the 
provision establishes much clarity regarding its interpretation. Both Canada and Russia have 
interpreted Article 234 liberally, implementing stringent environmental laws in vast areas of the 
Arctic, and, more controversially, requiring prior notification and authorisation for entry into their 
respective EEZ, measures clearly reflecting a de maximis interpretation.  
In contrast, the actions of a few states support a de minimis interpretation of Article 234, 
but condemnation is far from universal. Apart from the US and Singapore, few States have 
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protested Canadian and Russian actions. The US is not party to the LOSC and, while its protest 
might affect the development of customary international law, it has no direct effect on the 
interpretation of the LOSC.181  
Some States are not, moreover, in a position to protest. As discussed, many States have, 
like Canada and Russia, made extensive claims over their own EEZ. These States would be acting 
inconsistently with their own claims if there were to object to claims made in the Arctic. The 
Maldives, for example, which requires prior authorisation for any foreign flagged vessel to enter 
its EEZ, could not object to similar measures by other States, and especially not by Canada and 
Russia, which at least have some support for their actions in Article 234. 
Many States may still challenge extensive claims in the Arctic. The traditional international 
means for challenging such claims is by protest or by instituting legal proceedings under the LOSC 
or other international organs or by taking peaceful countermeasures.182 Currently, however, these 
options have only been used by the US and Singapore. A more likely option is a jurisdictional 
“battle”, which refers to the confrontation of competing claims, for instance by the exercise of 
legislative or enforcement jurisdiction, such as such as those by Canada and the US. At times, 
opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction will lead the legislating State to withdraw or modify its 
claim. At other times, the objecting State has to accept the new claim, as was the case with the 
United States and Article 234, which sought to preserve the freedom of navigation.  
The battle over the Arctic has arguably been raging for decades if not centuries, but the 
battleground is changing.183 Climate change has increased the interest in Arctic shipping and in 
Article 234, but it may also decrease the importance of the latter. If ice-cover in the Arctic is 
reduced as a result of global climate change to the extent that is widely predicted, many parts of 
Arctic EEZ will no longer be covered with ice for “most of the year” and thus the Arctic coastal 
 {PAGE  } 
States will no longer be able to rely on Article 234.184 When this may happen is still uncertain and 
it does not satisfactorily explain why so many States seem disinclined to make a clear statement 
on the appropriate reach of Article 234. 
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